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Abstract
Richard Epstein, over a long and distinguished career, has offered inspired insights into how a
legal system should be framed to serve the goals of those it governs. In that pursuit, he has relentlessly applied a sharp logic — call it Epstein’s Razor — to shave away the detritus of complexity
and confusion that surround perplexing problems, leaving standing only truths unscathed by competition among ideas. Over decades of diverse writings on law and political theory, highlighted
by his elegant Simple Rules for a Complex World, Professor Epstein offers a vision of law constructed on the view that simplicity in law is good — that legal rules have become too numerous
and complex and that, if law were set more firmly on elemental principles, the planet would be a
better place to live.
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More than half a millennium in the past, when scholars mostly worked in
monasteries, William of Ockham, a Franciscan friar who lived in England (c.
1285–1349), announced pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate—“plurality
ought not be posited without necessity” —meaning that the simplest explanation
usually is best. This idea, sometimes called “the law of economy” (or of
“parsimony,” lex parsimoniae) is traceable to Aristotle and endorsed by, among
others, Thomas Aquinas and Isaac Newton. In the words of Aquinas: “If a thing
can be done adequately by means of one, it is superfluous to do it by means of
several; for we observe that nature does not employ two instruments where one
suffices.” In 1852, Sir William Hamilton, 9th Baronet of Preston, dubbed this
concept Ockham’s Razor, and the moniker has stuck.1
I
Richard Epstein may not work in a monastery, but “the law of economy” fits his
view of law like a glove. In a masterful opus that extends far beyond the law of
torts, Simple Rules for a Complex World,2 Professor Epstein offers a vision of law
constructed on the view that simplicity in law is good, and that simplicity in fact
frames many aspects of law as it has evolved, and as it might better be conceived.
With inspired insight yet elegant simplicity, Epstein argues that legal rules have
become too numerous and complex, and that if law were set more firmly on
simple principles, and if it were comprised of fewer and simpler rules, the planet
would be a better place to live. Call this Epstein’s Razor.
In a world where people chase limited resources, the goals of fewer and
simpler rules proceed from a few simple premises: (1) that law should promote
the freedom of human beings, “autonomy”; (2) that freedom is enhanced by
maximizing resources, and resources are maximized by allowing a broad domain
of conduct governed by self-interest rather than by other-regarding norms; (3) that
rules should foster, not frustrate, human efforts and aspirations; (4) that simple
rules are preferable to those that are complex (rules that are dense, technical,
multi-sourced, and indeterminate); (5) that complex rules are administratively
expensive—to understand, comply with, and enforce—and so drain the limited
resource pool; and (6) that complex rules are acceptable only when they better
serve the first premise—promoting freedom.3 Revealing the virtues of simplicity,
Epstein’s premises are elemental and largely irrefutable.

1

Adhering to this precept, I direct readers for authority to Occam’s Razor,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam’s_razor.
2
Harvard University Press, 1995.
3
See id. ch. 1.
1
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Notwithstanding its essential virtues, simplicity has some enemies.4 First
is “perfect justice,” which, Epstein reminds us, is a legal iteration of an ideal that
easily falls prey to the familiar maxim that the perfect is the enemy of the good.
Obsessive efforts to achieve perfect justice in every case, rather than rough justice
in most cases, multiply the complexity of rules—which results in better justice in
some instances, but at a price that often is too high. Though increasing the
freedom of persons whose legal outcomes detailed rules convert from wrong to
right, such rules decrease the freedom of all persons who now must live in a more
complicated regime. And, not infrequently, the latter decreased freedom is
greater than the freedom saved by the effort to move justice toward perfection.
Another enemy of simplicity, Epstein explains, springs from efforts to
apply the types of complex rules that govern families and other kinds of intimate
groups to large-group situations involving strangers. In family and other smallgroup settings, behavioral norms reflect a multitude of differing talents, resources,
preferences, and expectations of the individual members of particular groups.
When people move norm-setting principles from groups that are small to those
that are large (as in the world of strangers we all inhabit), the nuanced set of
norms that operate so well (often implicitly) in small groups fit awkwardly at best.
Because people operating in large groups do not have the same levels of
information about and trust in other members that prevail in small-group settings,
norms for large groups must be framed as formal legal rules with operating
principles that are fewer, less individualized, and less complex.
Before examining how Professor Epstein’s simple-rule construct applies to
tort law problems, we might note how tort law fits broadly within his “libertarian
synthesis” of simple principles for organizing a complex world: “First apply the
property rules of self-ownership and first possession; next apply the general rules
of contract with respect to the endowments so acquired; and afterward apply the
tort laws to see that no impermissible actions of aggression took place.”5 More
fully, he explains that: (1) people have a natural right to “self-ownership”—
individual freedom or autonomy; (2) people have an inherent right to acquire
resources6 and put them to uses they deem best—freedom of property; (3) people
can maximize their personal welfare through voluntary exchanges of resources for
mutual gain—freedom of contract; and (4) since all people have an equal right to
freedom, they may not use force or deceit to infringe on the freedom interests of
others—infringements rectified by the law of torts. Together, these principles

4

See id. ch. 2. In the spirit of Ockham’s Razor, I direct readers for authority hereafter to
Professor Epstein’s book, which I shall henceforth cite only for quotations.
5
Id. at 72.
6
“[Y]ou take what you can get.” Id. at 59.
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“describe a world with strong and well-defined rights in persons and property,
complete freedom of exchange, and powerful protection against external threats.”7
II
Now that we have an outline of Richard Epstein’s fundamental principles, we are
equipped to examine how Epstein’s Razor informs a few particularized rules of
tort. What this inquiry reveals is that the razor is sharpest—and, hence, operates
most effectively—when rules are clear and reflect commonly-understood
communal norms. More simply, Epstein’s Razor explains and improves the law of
torts.
Comparative Negligence. For many years, Professor Epstein has explored how
tort law should apportion accidental losses among wrongdoers, notably between a
negligent defendant and a negligent plaintiff but also between multiple
defendants. On this issue, he long has advocated that damages be apportioned
equally (“pro rata”) between all parties responsible for an accident. So, if one
driver runs a red light, another is intoxicated and fails to maintain a proper
lookout, and a collision thereby ensures, both drivers should split the resulting
damages 50–50. If three negligent drivers together cause a collision, they should
split the damages evenly, three ways. Although contrary to prevailing law,
Epstein’s equal-division rule for damages apportionment draws from hoary legal
precedent (such as traditional admiralty law), and the pro rata principle still is
sound. So long as the negligence of each actor (say three) is a substantial and
proximate cause of a collision, it seems that none should be allowed to gamble on
coming out at the right end of a finely-tailored division of the damages—say,
28%, 37%, and 35%—but that each should simply be required to pay an equal
share. In addition to being easy to understand and cheap to administer, such a
simple and fundamentally fair (if “imperfect”) approach to apportionment should
decrease gaming and increase settlements, for it avoids asking jurors to formulate
divisions that reflect the advocacy skills of counsel more than any “true” divisions
of metaphysical responsibility.
Negligence. While Epstein’s view on apportionment illuminates the value of his
system of simple rules for accident law, his argument that strict liability is
7

Id. at 110. While this libertarian synthesis of principles sets the stage for a world of ordered
liberty, Epstein explains that this set of principles must be tempered by two others that cut the
other way, both of which are captured by his adage of “take and pay”—first, a limited privilege of
private necessity, actuated by “imminent peril to life or to property”; and, second, a police-power
principle of eminent domain, allowing government to take private property to benefit the
community, on paying the owner just compensation. Id. at 113, 128.
3
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preferable to negligence is more difficult to accept. While acknowledging that the
Hand calculus for determining due care and negligence fairly reflects a Golden
Rule approach that dates at least to Roman times (a norm requiring people “to
take the same level of care with the affairs of others that you would bring to your
own affairs”),8 he argues that informational and psychological frailties that
frustrate rational decisionmaking, combined with the indeterminacy of costbenefit evaluations of untaken precautions, support a general rule of strict liability
for causing harm. While Epstein’s arguments for strict liability are firmly
grounded in simplicity, minimizing costs, determinacy, and respect for equal
freedom, I agree with most observers that a better default rule for accident law, if
admittedly more complex, is fault—because, quite simply, it allows for a greater
sphere of freedom.9
Landowner Liability to Entrants. The common law conventionally determined a
landowner’s duty of care toward entrants based on whether the entrant was a
trespasser, licensee, or invitee. Under this scheme, landowners did not have to
provide safety for trespassers whose presence was not anticipated, reflecting
Epstein’s simple rule of property; and a landowner’s duty to licensees (reflecting
their equal right to freedom) normally was only to warn them of hidden dangers.
Toward invitees drawn onto commercial premises for business purposes,
however, landowners (being engaged with invitees in mutual exchange) had a
duty of reasonable care to warn them of hidden dangers and, often more
importantly, to put the premises in a reasonably safe condition. More recently, of
course, the trend has been to abolish these traditional categories in favor of a
single standard of reasonable care to entrants of most types, an approach
Professor Epstein accepts as a workable proxy for the traditional classification
scheme. Ultimately, however, Epstein justifiably opts for the traditional
approach—on grounds of lower cost, better results, and because the categorical
approach captures common mores more closely than a uniform standard of
reasonable care, a standard that may be simpler to state but is conceptually and
administratively more complex.10
Punitive Damages.
A final tort law issue, on which Richard Epstein
uncharacteristically has said little, is punitive damages—in particular, on the

8

Id. at 94.
See David G. Owen, Philosophical Foundations of Fault in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 201 (David G. Owen ed., 1995); David G. Owen, The Fault Pit, 26
GA. L. REV. 703 (1992).
10
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS § 12.11 (1999).
9
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method by which the amount of such awards should be determined.11
Traditionally, once a jury decides that a defendant’s flagrant misconduct warrants
punitive damages, it then determines a proper amount for such damages by
considering three factors: “the character of the defendant’s act [reprehensibility],
the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff which the defendant caused or
intended to cause, and the wealth of the defendant.”12 More recently, the United
States Supreme Court, searching for a way to limit excessive awards of punitive
damages under the due process clause, has hinted that some multiple of
compensatory damages (drawing from the second conventional measurement
factor) might appropriately cap the amount of such awards. Because of the
variety of purposes served by punitive damages, most commentators have
shunned this simple-multiple approach as a clumsy method for ascertaining how
much civil punishment should be assessed in specific cases of flagrantly inflicted
harm.
Perhaps Epstein’s reluctance to engage this provocative issue more fully
reflects his being tugged in different directions between two strong impulses, two
differing “rules of economy”: a rule of optimal deterrence, using the particular
malefactor’s likelihood of detection to generate a particular multiple of
compensatory damages applicable in particular circumstances; or, a rule that
simply assigns a predetermined multiple—like treble damages—in every case, an
approach that promotes deterrence (and restitution), if only roughly. In view of
Professor Epstein’s paucity of analysis on which of these two rules of economy
should control this vexing question, we might turn to a tool of decision he has
handed us already: Epstein’s Razor. And with this sharp instrument, the correct
approach is clear: treble damages, or some other predetermined multiple.13 Apart
from its grounding across many civilizations over the millennia, and over many
centuries of Anglo-American law, a predetermined multiple-damages approach is
far simpler and less expensive than the particularized optimal-deterrence rule; and
it has the added benefit of trimming the Supreme Court out of tort law’s hair,
which the optimal deterrence rule may not. Moreover, at least in cases involving
serious harm, a simple-multiple method serves roughly to cover all a victim’s
losses resulting from a flagrant wrong, a vital restitutionary function of this
special type of remedy in private law.14
11

The only source for Epstein’s views on this topic that I could find is RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 190 (1980). He there briefly notes his preference for
retribution over deterrence as a rationale for such damages, and for a double damages rule in
certain situations.
12
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2).
13
Double damages are, indeed, what Epstein long ago suggested, if only as a casual aside.
See supra note 11.
14
See David G. Owen, Aggravating Punitive Damages, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 181
(2010).
5

Journal of Tort Law, Vol. 3 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 2

III
Over a long and distinguished career, Richard Epstein has investigated how tort
principles fit in a legal system designed to serve the fundamental goals of the
people it governs. In that pursuit, he has relentlessly applied his razor, shaving
away the detritus of complexity and confusion, leaving only those truths that
remain unscathed by competition among ideas. Always, he has reminded us to
stay grounded in common sense, and grounded in the fundamentals—especially in
tort law’s foundational role in setting a behavioral structure by which humans can
live peaceably together while competing for resources in a world of scarcity. Tort
law accomplishes this objective by “enforc[ing] the separate domains in which all
of us, singly, can live our own lives as we see fit.”15 Libertarian elegance, at its
best, said so simply because it has nothing to hide, but rests on truth.

15

EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 92.
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